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In  the case  of  technology  transitions  to low-carbon  sources  of  energy,  there  is growing  evidence  that
even in  countries  with  a strong  political  consensus  in favor  of  a transition,  the  pace  has  been  slow  in
comparison  with  the need  to reduce  greenhouse  gases.  One  factor  that affects  the  slowness  of  the  tran-
sition is  political  resistance  from  the  incumbent  industrial  regime.  Using  data  on  the  mobilization  of
resistance  from  the  fossil-fuel  industry  in  the  United  States,  the  study  builds  on  the  growing  literatureeywords:
ransitions
echnology
ustainability
olitical coalitions
on the  political  dimensions  of  sustainability  transitions  by drawing  attention  to  the  role  of  incumbent
regime  coalitions,  grassroots  coalitions  in  support  of  green  transition  policies,  and  countervailing  indus-
trial power.  Case  studies  of  political  coalitions  for  ballot  propositions  in  the  U.S.  are  used to  show  how
countervailing  industrial  power,  especially  from  the  technology  and  ﬁnancial  sector,  can  tip  the  balance
of electoral  spending  in  favor  of  grassroots  organizations.ountervailing power
. Introduction
The literature on the transitions of sociotechnical systems gen-
rally assumes that the changes take place over a long period of
ime, such as a half century, and that the relatively slow pace of
 transition can be beneﬁcial, because a pace of several decades
r more can give some time for social practices, industrial orga-
izations, legislatures, and regulators to mitigate disruptions and
ide effects. However, in the case of sustainability transitions (STs)
o low-carbon energy sources, the slow pace has long-term envi-
onmental effects (e.g., greenhouse gases) that will prove costly.
any countries continue to increase fossil-fuel consumption, and
n many places the gains in renewable-energy production have
ot been substantial enough to reduce the growth in aggregate
missions (York, 2010, 2011). Even where national governments
ave embraced ST policies, existing energy regimes have often been
ffected only at the margins.
This research note will provide a perspective on the problem
f the slow pace of STs based on research in the United States,
here the fossil-fuel industry has mobilized to block ST policy
eforms. Although the focus on the U.S. and especially the state-
overnment level may  appear to be parochial, the choice of the U.S.
ase helps to counter-balance what Markard et al. (2012) describe
s the “European bias” in the ﬁeld of ST studies, that is, the ten-
ency for theories of STs to be founded on a base of European cases.
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The well-known cross-Atlantic gap in environmental social theory
between ecological modernization theory and treadmill theories
suggests the need to attend to the ways in which social theory does
not always travel well across societies (Mol  and Spaargaren, 2000;
Pellow et al., 2000; Scheinberg, 2003). To this point, Kern (2012)
ﬂags portability problems in ST theory and practice within Europe,
even between the historically related and cultural similar countries
of the Netherlands and the U.K. It is possible that attention to the
particularities of the blocked ST in the U.S. may  provide some gen-
eral insights into ST theory. For example, van der Loo and Loorbach
(2012) note that the Dutch Energy Transition Project has not been
able “to challenge the societal energy regime in any fundamen-
tal way” and that instead conservatives have debated subsidies for
renewables (2012, p. 242). Likewise, Kern and Smith (2008) note
that the project was dominated by large energy companies and by
a broader ideological climate of liberalization.
To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to clarify that frame-
works for the study of transitions of large sociotechnical systems
such as the multilevel perspective have been applied to other world
regions and with success, such as the transition to the internal
combustion machine in the U.S. transportation (Geels, 2005). The
study in question also drew attention to the counter-mobilization
of farmers who originally opposed sharing roads with motorized
vehicles. Rather than arguing that existing transition theory is inap-
plicable, the point is that a comparative perspective raises the
question of what kinds of issues are most relevant for the study
of a particular type of transition in a particular country and time
period. Certainly, there was  no carefully organized political opposi-
tion by the horse-and-carriage industry, or if there was, it is not part
of the currently understood history. Even Hughes’s (1983) detailed,
comparative study of the electriﬁcation transition only mentions in
Policy 
p
i
U
i
f
s
l
t
e
t
p
t
c
i
C
t
s
o
t
e
c
b
2
6
e
e
n
b
p
a
a
b
o
f
i
o
t
2
2
2
i
t
i
b
i
p
E
l
h
t
a
e
a
n
n
g
i
y
t
s
eD.J. Hess / Research 
assing political opposition from the gaslight industry. In contrast,
n the case of the green-energy transition in twenty-ﬁrst century
.S., the political contestation by the incumbent industrial regime
s so well organized that it should be at the center of the analytical
ramework. More generally, we can hypothesize that in political
ystems where there is an open, agonistic political process; a high
evel of industrial inﬂuence on the political ﬁeld through lax regula-
ion of campaign ﬁnancing and outright corruption; and a powerful
stablished industry that views a ST as threatening, then it is likely
hat the incumbent industry will mobilize a powerful and effective
olitical opposition to the proposed ST. In Europe there is a greater
endency for governments to dampen potential conﬂicts through
onsultative processes (Badaracco, 1985; Jasanoff, 2004). Although
ndustrial inﬂuence on politics occurs, it tends to be through the
ommission rather than through a vast network of media, think
ank, and campaign ﬁnancing organizations. By bringing out the
peciﬁcities of the American case, it is possible to shed general light
n STs as a political process. Speciﬁcally, this study investigates the
hesis that countervailing industrial power can provide a crucial
lement of support to pro-ST political coalitions when there is a
onﬂict with an incumbent regime that has mobilized to slow or
lock the transition.
. Literature review and framework
The study of STs is now an established research ﬁeld with
0–100 papers produced per year (Markard et al., 2012). An inﬂu-
ntial perspective is work from a multilevel perspective, which
mphasizes the dynamics between niches and incumbent tech-
ological regimes (e.g., Geels, 2011). In the case of STs, there is
road recognition that government industrial policy is needed to
rovide protective support to new industrial niches such as renew-
ble energy ﬁrms until they have achieved sufﬁcient scale (Smith
nd Raven, 2012). In Europe and some other world regions, there is a
road policy consensus in favor of a ST for energy, and thus the issue
f political conﬂict over STs is less important theoretically, and the
ocus of research tends to involve issues of management and policy
mplementation. However, there is a small but growing literature
n transitions in general and STs in particular that pays attention
o the political and power dimensions of STs (Flor and Rotmans,
009; Geels, 2011; Genus and Coles, 2008; Rotmans and Kemp,
008; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith et al., 2005; Smith and Raven,
012). For example, Meadowcroft, (2009, 2011) also points to the
rreducibly political character of STs, the difﬁculties of deﬁning sus-
ainable technologies, and issues of democratic participation. An
mportant aspect of the politics of STs is the potential for them to
ecome politically contested. Geels and Schot (2007) recognize that
n the transformation pathway, the incumbent regime may resist
roposed changes, and it may  alter its trajectory of development.
lzen et al. (2011) discuss how animal welfare advocates mobi-
ized for better treatment of farm animals, and they also describe
ow farmers experienced technical difﬁculties and pushed back on
he reforms. Grin (2010) analyzes the broader transition to sustain-
ble agriculture as a contested political process that involved the
nvironmental movement, sustainable farmers, industrial farmers,
nd government agencies. Likewise, Jørgensen (2012) uses actor-
etwork theory to study the longstanding political conﬂict between
uclear and wind energies in Denmark. In general, there has been
rowing interest in the role of social movements as crucial actors
n the politics of STs (e.g., Hess, 2007; Geels and Verhees, 2011).
Although research on the politics of STs is growing, it has not
et fully analyzed situations in which organizations associated with
he incumbent regime mobilize to halt a nascent or growing ST. To
ome degree general coalition theory in political sociology is a rel-
vant resource. The literature has studied conditions that facilitate43 (2014) 278– 283 279
coalition formation among grassroots groups, including social ties
among organizations; shared frames and goals, which are often
forged through compromises and are enhanced by individuals who
serve as bridge brokers; and political context, which includes both
the openness to change of elites and the threats posed to organi-
zations (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). However, this literature
does not provide a systematic explanation of the mechanisms that
enable coalitions to achieve their goals when there is resistance
from an incumbent regime that is represented by a politically pow-
erful dominant industry. On this point Showm (2011) suggests that
the relative unity or disunity of business interests is one impor-
tant factor that shapes the outcomes of ST politics. Building on
this argument and general work on the political sociology of social
movements and technology (e.g., Moore et al., 2011), this study
suggests that the conceptual framework for studying STs should
include the relations among established industry coalitions, grass-
roots or green transition coalitions, and countervailing industrial
power. Thus, the approach to the issue of power in STs focuses on
a conﬂicted political ﬁeld in the Bourdieusian sense in which coali-
tions mobilize to support, block, or modify ST policies (Bourdieu,
2005). As applied to the problem of STs, the approach has three
crucial mechanisms of mobilization:
1. Incumbent regime mobilization. Incumbent regimes are viewed
not simply as bodies of rules and institutions but as organized
agents in the political ﬁeld. They mobilize against ST policies
that are perceived to threaten their short-term proﬁtability and
long-term existence. In the cases that follow, the established
industry coalition includes the petroleum, coal, and natural gas
industries; the electrical utilities with the concerns for baseload
generation and an interest in nuclear power; and right-wing
think tanks and conservative political leaders who  frame the
green-energy transition as the improper government role in the
economy.
2. Grassroots mobilizations of green-transition coalitions. Social
movement organizations will form coalitions to support ST
policies, and they will forge frames and discourses that allow
cross-movement solidarity (Mayer, 2008). The green-transition
coalitions include blue-green (labor-environmental) alliances,
urban political constituencies that support green jobs, and the
rising industries in a niche positions (e.g., green-energy indus-
tries; Hess, 2012).
3. Countervailing industry mobilization. Countervailing industrial
power is a concept developed from Galbraith (1952) that is
used here to refer to industrial power that can provide the
ﬁnancial and political resources to support grassroots coalitions.
Increasingly, wealthy individuals in the high-technology and
ﬁnancial services industries have provided high levels of fund-
ing in political campaigns that can counter-balance fossil-fuel
industry funding.
3. Political coalitions and the energy transition in the U.S.
3.1. Spatial and scalar unevenness in the U.S.
The cases presented here will focus on the green-energy ST in
the US, speciﬁcally the conﬂict over fossil-fuels versus renewable
energy at the state-government level, where there is considerable
variation and unevenness. The focus responds to what Markard
et al. (2012) describe as a second “bias” in the literature on STs, the
tendency for the literature to focus on national rather than subna-
tional or urban levels of analysis (2012, p. 961). Likewise, Coenan
et al. (2012) also argue for the importance of attention to spatial and
scalar dynamics in the study of STs. In the U.S. during the adminis-
tration of Republican President George W.  Bush (2000–2008), the
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olitical opportunity structure for green-energy policy reform was
ostly closed at the federal government level. Consequently, pol-
cy reform in support of energy-related STs took place largely in
he state governments where there were political openings, that is,
sually states with a relatively small fossil-fuel industry, a greater
ocus on high-technology (and in some cases clean-technology),
nd political control by the center-left Democratic Party. In con-
rast, in the oil states near the Gulf of Mexico and in states
ith strong coal and natural gas industries, the political opportu-
ity structure for energy-related STs was relatively closed (Hess,
012). There were also variations among the industries: coal and
etroleum companies tended to be most opposed to green-energy
ransition politics, whereas natural gas was positioning itself as a
lean energy that was reducing carbon-dioxide emissions as it dis-
laced coal, and nuclear energy attempted to use the green transi-
ion to end the decades-long moratorium on new construction and
n some cases to gain inclusion in clean-energy portfolio standards.
During ﬁrst two years of the Obama administration
2009–2010), the political opportunity structure opened at
he federal government level. There was a push to implement the
ampaign promise of creating ﬁve million green jobs, a promise
hat had helped to mobilize the grassroots coalition of labor, envi-
onmental, and low-income constituencies that had supported
bama’s 2008 campaign. In effect, there was an emergent national
reen-energy ST policy. However, when Congress considered
andmark legislation in support of a cap-and-trade framework and
 national renewable electricity portfolio standard, the incumbent
egime coalition mobilized and defeated the proposed law and
urged the Republican Party of pro-environmental moderates.
he mid-term elections of 2010 returned many new members to
ongress, most of whom had made pledges to fossil-fuel interests
ot to support climate-change science and green-energy policy
Johnson, 2010). Indeed, when the Republican Party regained
olitical control of the House of Representatives in 2010, it
aunched a series of attacks on funding for climate science and on
nvironmental policy generally.
After the resurgence of the right in 2010 and the defeat of
limate-change legislation, the Obama administration pursued a
ore quiet, administratively based policy of greening that included
reening procurement policies in the military and developing vol-
ntary fuel-efﬁciency standards from the automotive industry.
ction then returned to the state governments, and the Blue-Green
lliance (the crucial grassroots coalition organization) shifted its
trategy from national to regional meetings. However, at the state
overnment level, the 2010 election resulted in the shift of power
n many states from Democratic to Republican Party governors, and
ith the shift came a substantial unwinding of green-energy poli-
ies and programs. In states that retained Democratic legislatures
nd governorships, most importantly California, green transition
olicies continued to advance, often with signiﬁcant new laws. Our
ultivariate analysis of the votes on state-government laws also
howed that the relative strength of fossil-fuel industry employ-
ent for each state was a signiﬁcant predictor of opposition to
reen-energy policies (Coley and Hess, 2012).
.2. Coalition politics in state-level ballot initiatives
One political ﬁeld where it is possible to measure the conﬂict of
oalitions is state-government ballot referenda. The ballot proposi-
ion process was  originally intended as a vehicle to promote direct
emocratic participation to circumvent corrupt state legislatures.
owever, it can also be used as a site for anti-ST mobilizations
y incumbent industrial regimes. For example, in 2010 in California
ossil-fuel companies attempted to derail the state government’s
andmark AB 32 law, which set in place the mechanism for a
ap-and-trade regime of carbon regulation. Discourse and framing43 (2014) 278– 283
were relevant: Proposition 23 was  cleverly worded as a job-saving
measure in a period of high unemployment, and the supporting
committee, named the California Jobs Initiative Committee, argued
that the cap-and-trade regime would increase energy costs, hurt
businesses, and reduce jobs. The three largest donors ($8 million
of the $10.7 million recorded) were two Texas-based petroleum
companies and one Kansas-based company associated with the
brothers David and Charles Koch (National Institute on Money
in State Politics, 2012d). The opposing grassroots coalition, the
Stop Dirty Energy Committee, was  led by environmental groups
with support from labor unions and ethnic minority groups and
with additional support from the relatively pro-green Republican
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. The coalition’s counter-frame
involved opposition to out-of-state inﬂuence on California politics
and the environmental justice dimensions of dirty air. The coalition
received signiﬁcant funding from the countervailing industry—the
state’s venture capital, technology, and ﬁnance leaders—who were
invested in the transition to the clean economy. The countervail-
ing industrial power was  crucial, because it provided the ﬁnancial
resources to outspend the fossil-fuel industry. The total raised to
defeat the proposition was $33 million, with at least half of that
money coming from the state’s ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE) sector (ibid.). Thus, the countervailing industry turned what
would have been a relatively even spending situation into one in
which the grassroots coalition side dominated and was  able to pro-
tect the state’s global warming law.
In 2012, two  other environmental measures appeared on the
state’s ballot. Proposition 27 would have required mandatory label-
ing of genetically modiﬁed food. The grassroots coalition in support
of the proposition included natural foods, organic farming, and
environmental organizations, but they were able to raise only $8
million in contrast with over $40 million raised by the incumbent
regime coalition, the genetically modiﬁed food and food processing
industries, and the measure was  defeated. The other environ-
mentally related ballot measure, Proposition 39, increased the
income tax on out-of-state businesses based on their in-state sales
and channeled the revenue to clean energy and energy efﬁciency
projects. The successful ballot measure had only a meager oppo-
sition incumbent regime coalition: $45,000 from General Motors
and two other companies. In contrast, the supporting commit-
tees had $27 million in funding, most of which came from Thomas
Steyer, again a wealthy member of the state’s ﬁnancial services
industry who supports community development, environmental,
and Democratic Party causes (National Institute on Money in State
Politics, 2012b). Thus, again one can see the importance of counter-
vailing industrial power from the green side of California’s ﬁnancial
services industry.
During the 2012 elections the other major environmentally
related state-government ballot initiative was the battle in Michi-
gan over Proposal 3, which would have increased the state’s
renewable portfolio standard for electricity from 10% to 25% by
2025. The grassroots coalition was  led by Michigan Energy, Michi-
gan Jobs, which linked the proposal to job creation by arguing that
renewable energy would generally be produced in-state and would
replace out-of-state jobs in the coal and natural gas industries.
Furthermore, by spurring in-state renewable-energy generation,
the demand policy could also provide beneﬁts for the state’s
manufacturing industry, which has struggled to diversify from its
heavy historical reliance on automotive manufacturing into wind-
turbine manufacturing and other industries. The proposal would
have included the renewable portfolio standard in the state’s
constitution, a change that would have protected the measure
from political reversal. The conservative lobbying organization
American Legislative Exchange Council (2011), which sponsors
model legislation for state governments, had targeted the state-
government renewable portfolio standards with its campaign for
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tate governments to enact “Electricity Freedom Acts.” Thus, the use
f a constitutional amendment could have protected the renewable
ortfolio standard from assaults by the coalition of political con-
ervatives and fossil-fuel interests. However, the mechanism was
olitically controversial, and the relatively moderate Republican
overnor argued that it would tie the hands of the legislature.
The two battling coalitions raised different levels and types of
onations. The incumbent regime coalition raised over $30 million
ollars across seven committees. The largest support was  for Clean
ffordable Renewable Energy (CARE) for Michigan, which received
ver $23 million in support, almost all of which was  from the util-
ties DTE Energy and CME  Energy (National Institute on Money in
tate Politics, 2012c). With that funding, the organization was  able
o develop a much longer list of supporters that included chambers
f commerce, some manufacturers, some locals of the International
rotherhood of Electrical Workers, and even some ethnic minority
roups. Thus, the organization was able to frame its message as that
f a grassroots movement organization, even though it was  essen-
ially a front group (an “astroturf” organization) for the utilities.
he second largest support was $3.45 million from the Michigan
hamber of Commerce PAC II, which in turn received $2.5 million
rom the state’s Republican Party and provided support to ﬁve dif-
erent ballot measures. The third largest source of support was from
mericans for Prosperity, a national organization that is associated
ith fossil-fuel interests and the conservative ﬁnanciers Charles
nd David Koch.
able 1
unding for ballot measures in American States related to renewable energy, 2000–2012.
Ballot
measure
Vote Outcome
desired by
grass-roots
coalition
Description P
($
T
d
2004
Colorado
Amend. 37
Pass Yes RPS for some utilities $
M
2006
California
Prop. 87
Fail No $4 billion for energy research, tax
on energy companies
$
$
$
2006
Washington
Measure 937
Pass Yes RPS for some utilities $
$
R
2008
California
Prop. 7
Fail No 50% RPS by 2025 $
$
p
2008
California
Prop.  10
Fail Yes $5 billion bonds, geared to
natural gas
$
$
(n
$
2008
Missouri
Prop  C
Pass Yes RPS for some utilities $
W
o
2010
California
Prop. 23
Fail Yes Would stall cap-and-trade
program
$
$
$
$
2010
Maine
Question 2
Pass Yes Bonds for off-shore wind, green
industry, energy efﬁciency
$
M
C
2012
Michigan
Prop.  12–3
Fail No Constitutional amendment for
RPS of 25% by 2025
$
$
e
o
$
C
la
ource: National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2012a.
ey: env. = environmentalist, RE = Renewable Energy, RPS = renewable portfolio standard.43 (2014) 278– 283 281
In contrast, the grassroots coalition raised only $15.5 million
(National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2012c). Of the
$11 million raised by the lead organization (Michigan Energy,
Michigan Jobs), the largest donors were environmental organiza-
tions, the Green Tech Action Fund (a San Francisco-based fund
representing the clean-tech industry), the Blue-Green Alliance, and
a hedge fund manager who gave $1 million. Of the remaining $4
million raised by other committees, the leading organizations were
three environmental organizations and the Green Tech Action Fund.
The state’s powerful United Autoworkers Union also supported the
measure but did not appear in the records as a major donor. Thus,
although there was  some support from the countervailing ﬁnance
and technology industries, it was much more limited than in the
case of the two  California energy propositions discussed above.
In summary, California Propositions 23 in 2010 and 39 in 2012
had signiﬁcantly more ﬁnancial power in support of the green-
energy position than the opposing position. Grassroots coalitions
were able to raise more money than opponents due to support
from the countervailing ﬁnancial industry, and they were polit-
ically successful. In contrast, California Proposition 27 (for food
labeling) and Michigan’s Proposal 3 were heavily outspent by the
incumbent regime coalition, and they were defeated. Furthermore,
the crucial ﬁnancial ﬁrepower in the successful California cases
was  provided the state’s technology and ﬁnance sector, which has
tended to cast its lot with clean technology through many invest-
ments. Google, for example, has invested $280 million in rooftop
ro Spending
 Thousands)
otal raised, followed by largest
onors
Con spending
($ Thousands)
Total raised, followed by largest donors
1446 total:
ostly env. orgs
$1284 total:
Excel, rural cooperatives
(utilities)
61,886 total:
49,581 S. Bing (ﬁlm)
2043 V. Khosla (ﬁnance)
$94,404 total:
$38,000 Chevron
$32,824 Area Energy
$9550 Occidental Oil & Gas
$3025 ConocoPhillips
1674 total:
108 J. Blumenthal (ﬁnance)
E ﬁrms, env. orgs.
$592 total:
Mostly lumber and paper
9360 total:
9000 P. Sperling (Apollo, for
roﬁt-education)
$29,787 total:
$13,895 PG&E (utility)
$13.720 Edison (utility)
22,721 total (anti-env.):
18,647 Clean Energy Fuels Co.
atural gas)
3000 Chesapeake Energy
$173 total (pro-env.):
Teachers, consumers, labor, env. orgs
1030 total:
ind ﬁrms & environmental
rgs.
$0
10,790 total (anti-env.):
5075 Valero (oil & gas)
2040 Tesoro (oil & gas)
1000 Flint (oil & gas)
$33,200 total (pro-env.):
$5000 S.Thomas (ﬁnance)
$3000 National Wildlife Fed.
$1537 NRDC (env.)
$1037 V. Khosla (ﬁnance)
$1000 J. Doerr (ﬁnance)
438 total:
aine Economic Growth
oalition, Build Maine PAC
$0
15,515 total:
11,123 Coalition of
nvironmental, RE, and labor
rganizations
1.659 MI  League of
onservation Voters (also
rgest coalition contributor)
$29,128 total:
$11,644 CMS Energy (utility)
$11,570 DTE Energy (utility)
$2506 MI  Republican Party (lead donor of a
Chamber of Commerce political action
committee)
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olarization ﬁnancing, and Silicon Valley venture capitalists were
ery active in the defeat of Proposition 23 (Bass, 2011).
The capacity to attract ﬁnancial support is crucial for ballot
ropositions associated with green energy. A review of the entire
et of ballot propositions associated with renewable energy for
hich data are currently available shows how important funding
an be (See Table 1.) In this table, we see that outcomes desired by
rassroots organizations were successful six times and not success-
ul three times. (In two cases, California’s 2008 Proposition 10 and
010 Proposition 23, environmentalists viewed the ballot proposi-
ions as detrimental to their goals and worked for their failure;
hus, a success in these two cases was the failure of the ballot
roposition.) The 2006 ballot initiative in California is particularly
nteresting because it shows the possible limits of countervailing
ower in that state: supporters led by wealthy donors in the ﬁlm
nd ﬁnance industries raised over $60 million, but it was signiﬁ-
antly less than the amount raised by the fossil-fuel companies,
nd the ballot measure failed. Of the six outcomes deemed suc-
esses from the standpoint of the grassroots coalitions, ﬁve had
igher funding for the outcome that they desired. Conversely, of
he three failures, all had higher funding by incumbent regime
rganizations, that is, utilities or donors associated with fossil-fuel
ompanies (P < .05, two tailed, Fisher’s Exact test).
. Conclusion
The argument is not a simplistic one about the golden role of
olitics (those who have the gold set the rules). Rather, the point is
o use one type of ST in one country to draw out broader theoretical
mplications, speciﬁcally, the need to include countervailing indus-
rial power in the study of conﬂicts among political coalitions in the
tudy of STs. In addition to state actors such as governors, the frame-
ork here draws attention to three main types of non-state actors:
he role of incumbent regimes, grassroots social movements, and
ctors associated with countervailing industrial power.
Although the cases point to the important role of ﬁnancial con-
ributions to ballot success, spending on a ballot proposition or a
olitical campaign is not the only method by which the coalitions
chieve success. Labor unions in coalition with ethnic minority
roups have proven especially effective in the “ground game” of
etting out the vote, generally for Democratic Party candidates.
urthermore, there is evidence for a more long-term, underlying
attern of change that is occurring as the green-energy indus-
ries slowly grow. For example, in our tracking of the absolute
mployment ﬁgures in California, the number of green jobs is now
ver twice that of fossil-fuel jobs; in other words, the state may
ave reached a political tipping point in which the ST political
onstituency is now more powerful than the incumbent regime
onstituency (at least for the energy transition). Similar patterns
lso hold for other very green states, such as Massachusetts, New
ork, Oregon, and Washington.
This situation may  appear to be unique to the United States,
nd it might be easy for international readers to interpret the focus
n conﬂicting coalitions as parochial and irrelevant for broader
omparative work. However, there are echoes of similar anti-ST
oalitions in some European parliaments, especially in cases where
ight-wing parties have come to political power. Furthermore, in
he newly industrialized countries such as China and India there
re deep tensions between the need to transition to low-carbon
nergy sources and the temptation to meet rapid growth in energy
emand with continued development of fossil fuels. Thus, the sit-
ation that is heightened in the U.S. may  be of general value for
he study of STs. With the development of new opportunities for
he extraction of petroleum and natural gas from hydraulic frac-
uring technologies and the opening of the Arctic Ocean to drilling,43 (2014) 278– 283
it is possible that conﬂicts of the type described for the U.S. will
become more general. If that occurs, the study of conﬂicts among
coalitions will be become more central in the general study of STs.
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